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Using data on the investments a large number of individual investors made through a discount 
broker from 1991 to 1996, we find that the stock trades by households with concentrated 
portfolios outperform those with diversified portfolios. While in general the stocks bought by 
individual investors significantly underperform the stocks they sell, the reverse is true for 
households whose holdings are concentrated in a few stocks. The excess return of concentrated 
relative to diversified portfolios is stronger for households with large account balances as well as 
for stocks not included in the S&P 500 Index and local stocks, potentially reflecting concentrated 
investors’ successful exploitation of information asymmetries. This finding is very robust to 
alternative concentration measures and regression specifications, and to alternative explanations 
such as differences across concentrated and diversified investors in the portfolio turnover and 
access to inside information, suggesting that some of these concentrated households have 
superior information processing skills. Moreover, controlling for a household’s average 
investment ability, the household’s trades perform better as the household’s portfolio includes 
fewer stocks. However, while concentrated household portfolios on average outperform 
diversified ones, their levels of total risk are larger and the Sharpe ratios of their stock portfolios 
are lower. 
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Despite the longstanding and widespread financial advice to hold well-diversified portfolios, 
several studies have found that many individual investors instead tend to concentrate their 
portfolios in a small number of stocks.
1 There are a few key reasons why households might hold 
poorly diversified portfolios. First, a lack of diversification could be prompted by behavioral 
biases such as familiarity
2 or overconfidence.
3 That is, households’ investment decisions might 
be affected by a tendency to consider investing in only a relatively small subset of companies 
one is familiar with or confident in, though not necessarily informed about. Second, individual 
investors might hold concentrated portfolios because they are able to identify stocks with high 
expected abnormal returns. Under such circumstances, rational investors would need to assess 
the trade-off between the benefits of higher stock returns with the costs of higher total risk and 
the implications of combining such prospective investments with their existing portfolios. The 
main contribution of this paper is to compare the performance of investors with concentrated and 
diversified holdings and to shed some light as to why investors might hold undiversified 
portfolios. 
If under-diversification is driven solely by behavioral effects, then concentrated 
household portfolios on average should not exhibit superior performance. For example, if 
portfolio concentration stems from familiarity bias or overconfidence, the holdings of 
concentrated investors will not earn superior returns on average relative to stocks held by 
diversified households. Indeed, in the context of 401(k) plans, Benartzi (2001) finds that 
concentrated allocations to company stock (one that its employees participating in its 401(k) plan 
are surely familiar with) do not predict future company stock returns. However, if households 
that have favorable information concerning a stock act upon this information by tilting their 
portfolio towards it, then the stock-picking ability of concentrated households should be superior 
to that of diversified households. Moreover, if informational advantages are the cause of the 
superior performance, the abnormal returns should be generated by investments that have greater 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Blume and Friend (1975), Kelly (1995), Barber and Odean (2000), and Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2001). 
2 There is a body of evidence that investors tend to invest disproportionately in the companies with which they are 
relatively familiar. French and Poterba (1991) document a tendency for investors to favor domestic over 
international stocks. Huberman (2001) shows that the shareholders of a Regional Bell Operating Company tend to 
live in the area that it serves. Zhu (2002) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2004) show that individual investors who 
invest through a discount broker exhibit considerable local bias. In the context of 401(k)-plan investing, participants 
on average have considerable holdings in own-company stock (Benartzi (2001) and Liang and Weisbenner (2002)). 
3 Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) show that individual investors tend to trade excessively and that 
such behavior is consistent with overconfidence.   2
informational asymmetries (e.g., stocks not in the S&P 500 Index, particularly those local to the 
investor). 
Research in cognitive psychology suggests that there are limits to human capacity for 
processing information and conducting more than a limited number of tasks at a time and that 
such processing limitations might constrain human reasoning and problem solving.
4 Cognitive 
limitations notwithstanding, in reasonably efficient financial markets, the availability of 
particularly insightful value-relevant information may be scarce and difficult to identify and the 
ensuing search costs may be prohibitively large. Assuming that the availability of relevant 
information and/or the information processing skills of investors are limited, households may be 
better off investing in a subset of the limited number of stocks with informational asymmetries. 
Expansions of the portfolio beyond this limited subset into additional stocks will likely depress 
portfolio performance, either because the stocks about which one may possess superior 
information have already been tapped or because the increasing number of different investments 
lessens one’s ability to effectively monitor any of them. 
The empirical literature studying the performance of individual investors finds that, on 
average, households’ stock investments perform poorly. For example, Odean (1999) reports that 
individual investors’ purchases tend to underperform their sales by a significant margin. Barber 
and Odean (2000, 2001) further show that, on average, individual investors who hold common 
stocks pay a substantial penalty in performance for trading actively. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that individual investors are overconfident and trade excessively.  
  On the other hand, certain individual investors have been found to fare better. Coval, 
Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2002) document that individual investors that have performed 
abnormally well in the past continue to perform abnormally well in the future. Thus, it appears 
that some skillful individual investors might be able to exploit market inefficiencies to earn 
abnormal profits. Ivković and Weisbenner (2004) find that households exhibit a strong 
preference for local investments and further show that, on average, individuals’ investments in 
local stocks outperform their investments in non-local stocks, suggesting that investors are able 
to exploit local knowledge. The excess return is particularly large for stocks not included in the 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Miller (1956), Piaget (1971), Bachelder and Denny (1977), Dempster (1981), Chapman (1990), 
Just and Carpenter (1992), and Cantor and Engle (1993).   3
S&P 500 Index, in regard to which informational asymmetries between local and non-local 
investors may be the largest. 
Using data on the investments a large number of individual investors made through a 
discount broker from 1991 to 1996, we study the relation between the performance of 
households’ trades and the concentration of their portfolios, with a particular focus on 
households with substantial account balances. Consistent with Odean (1999), we find that, on 
average, the stocks bought by individual investors underperform the stocks they sell by a wide 
margin. However, we find that the reverse is true for households with concentrated investments. 
Specifically, we find that the trades of concentrated households perform significantly better than 
the trades of diversified households (note that, throughout the paper, we use the term 
“diversified” rather loosely–simply to refer to investors who hold portfolios that are not 
concentrated in one or a few stocks, i.e., the opposite of concentrated investors).
5 This result is 
particularly strong for households with large account balances. The purchases of diversified 
investors with account balances of at least $100,000 underperform their sales by 1.8 percentage 
points per year. On the other hand, the purchases of concentrated investors with such large 
account balances outperform their sales by 3.0 percentage points per year. The excess return 
associated with concentration is stronger for investments in local stocks and stocks that are not 
included in the S&P 500 Index (which tend to have less analyst coverage and national media 
attention), potentially reflecting concentrated investors’ ability to exploit informational 
asymmetries. In sum, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that skilled investors can 
exploit informational asymmetries by concentrating their portfolios in the stocks about which 
they have particularly favorable information. 
Across all households, the stock picks made by concentrated investors outperform those 
made by diversified investors by about one percentage point over the year following the 
purchase, with the difference in performance growing to three percentage points for households 
with relatively large portfolios (i.e., $25,000 or more) and to four percentage points for those 
with the largest portfolios (i.e., $100,000 or more). However, the purchases made by 
concentrated households with small portfolios (i.e., less than $25,000) do not outperform the 
purchases made by diversified households. 
                                                 
5 However, as Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) point out, “diversified” investors may not be really diversified, as the 
correlations in returns among stocks within portfolios with many holdings can be fairly high.   4
Unlike households with small portfolios, wealthy households have the resources to hold a 
larger number of stocks, if desired, and thus obtain the potential benefits of diversification. The 
fixed costs of purchasing securities make it uneconomical for households with limited wealth to 
hold a large number of securities directly. It is also likely that some wealthy households might 
have greater access to value-relevant information and might possess processing skills superior to 
those prevailing among households with smaller accounts, causing this portion of investors to 
concentrate their portfolios in a few investments.  
This leads to two clear predictions. First, there should be a much greater dispersion in the 
diversification levels of large portfolios relative to small portfolios. Second, among households 
with large portfolios, concentrated investors should be better stock pickers, as informed investors 
may be under-diversified, holding substantial positions in the stocks with the most promising 
prospects, while uninformed investors would rationally hold a more diversified portfolio. Large 
household portfolios indeed display more variation in their diversification levels, potentially in 
accordance with the degree of their informational advantage.
6 On the other hand, households 
with small portfolios may hold very few stocks because of fixed commissions and other trading 
costs and/or have less access to value-relevant information, leading to no relation between 
performance and concentration for this group of investors, while there is such a relation for 
investors with larger portfolios. 
However, rather than reflecting investor stock-picking ability, the superior performance 
of concentrated households could also be attributed to alternative explanations such as 
differences across the two groups of investors in the volatility of stocks purchased, turnover of 
household portfolios, some omitted investor-specific variable like financial sophistication, and 
the exploitation of inside information. We explore these alternatives and show that they cannot 
explain the finding. A particularly compelling result is that the trades made by concentrated 
households outperform the trades made by diversified households even after adjusting for 
household fixed effects, that is, after controlling for households’ average investment abilities. 
We also conduct several other robustness checks including exploring alternative measures of 
                                                 
6 Specifically, households with stock portfolios of $100,000 or more held 11.7 stocks on average with an 
interquartile range of 4 – 16 stocks. The 10
th and 90
th percentiles were 2 and 24 stocks, respectively. However, 
households with stock portfolios less than $25,000 or more held only 2.4 stocks on average with an interquartile 
range of 1 – 3 stocks. Their 10
th and 90
th percentiles were 1 and 5 stocks, respectively.   5
concentration and aggregating the trades and the holdings of concentrated and diversified 
investors to form portfolios. 
We do not argue that investors should hold poorly diversified portfolios. The relation 
between performance and portfolio concentration among individual investors does not mean that 
simply altering one’s portfolio to hold just a few stocks will improve its performance. Rather, it 
suggests that some investors with superior stock-picking ability exploit that advantage by 
concentrating their portfolio in a few stocks. Portfolio concentration only has benefits if the 
investor’s informational advantage is sufficiently large and if the investor is sufficiently risk 
tolerant.  
While we do find that, on average, wealthy households holding highly concentrated 
portfolios perform significantly better than households holding widely diversified portfolios, we 
also find that concentrated portfolios have substantially higher levels of total risk. Indeed, we 
show that, although concentrated household portfolios on average outperform diversified ones, 
their levels of total risk are larger and the Sharpe ratios of their stock portfolios are lower.  
Our results are consistent with those reported by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2004), 
who study the diversification of actively managed equity mutual funds. They report that mutual 
funds that are concentrated in specific industries perform better than widely diversified mutual 
funds. They attribute those results to the skilled mutual fund managers’ tendency to select their 
asset holdings from a limited number of industries, presumably because their expertise is linked 
to those industries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After describing the data sources and 
presenting summary statistics in Section I, in Section II we study the performance of the trades 
of households with varying degrees of portfolio concentration. Upon finding that the trades of 
concentrated households perform substantially better, particularly for households with large 
accounts, we further examine whether the superior performance is robust to the inclusion of 
investor fixed effects and is driven by investments in stocks regarding which there are likely to 
be greater informational asymmetries. Section III considers alternative explanations for the 
superior performance of the trades of concentrated individual investors we find in Section II, 
including checking for differences across concentrated and diversified investors in the access to 
and exploitation of inside information, the turnover in households’ stock portfolios, and the 
volatility of transacted stocks. Section IV presents additional robustness checks, including   6
portfolio analyses of the trades and stock positions of concentrated and diversified households, as 
well as a discussion of the risk-return tradeoff for concentrated investment strategies. Section V 
concludes. 
I. Data and Summary Statistics 
The primary data source used in this study, obtained from a discount broker, includes 
individual investors’ monthly trades and positions over a six-year period between 1991 and 
1996. The data set captures all the investments that 78,000 households made through the 
brokerage house, covering common stocks, mutual funds, bonds, foreign securities, and 
derivative securities. The data set also provides some additional information about the 
households such as their zip codes. See Barber and Odean (2000) for a detailed description of the 
data set. 
We focus on the common stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets. 
Common stock investments constitute nearly two-thirds of the total value of household 
investments in the sample. We use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to 
obtain information on stock prices and returns and COMPUSTAT to obtain several firm 
characteristics, including the location of the company headquarters. We exclude stocks that could 
not be matched with CRSP (they were most likely listed on local exchanges or traded over the 
counter).  
A. Concentration of Stock Holdings 
We use the Herfindahl Index as a measure of the concentration of the individual 
investors’ stock holdings. The Herfindahl Index HIh,t of household h at time t is defined as the 
sum of the squared weights of each stock i in the household portfolio ( h
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The Herfindahl Index equals one if a household owns only one common stock, and an 
equally-weighted portfolio of N securities has a Herfindahl Index of 1/N. The index decreases as 
households become more diversified across different securities.   7
We present the basic portfolio characteristics of the households in our sample in Table I. 
The sample contains 268,734 household-year observations. The mean account balance of 
$45,604 is substantially larger than the median balance of $13,865. A large fraction of brokerage 
accounts have relatively small balances. Around two-thirds of households have portfolio values 
below $25,000 and only nine percent of households have portfolio values above $100,000.  
Past studies have found that households do not tend to diversify their account holdings 
across a large number of common stocks.
7 Indeed, in our sample, households own on average 3.9 
stocks in their brokerage account and the average Herfindahl Index of household portfolios 
equals 0.62. The median portfolio includes two stocks and has a Herfindahl Index of 0.56. One 
third of the households own only one stock, but this concentration is driven by the small 
accounts.  
Among households with larger portfolios, however, we find large variation in the extent 
of portfolio diversification (recall that, throughout the paper, we use the term “diversified” rather 
loosely–we use it simply to refer to investors who hold portfolios that are not concentrated in one 
or a few stocks, i.e., the opposite of concentrated investors). Focusing on households with a stock 
portfolio of at least $100,000, the 10
th and 90
th percentiles of the distribution of the number of 
stocks held are 2 and 24 stocks, respectively, while the 10
th and 90
th percentiles of the Herfindahl 
Index span from 0.07 to 0.93. The average number of stocks increases substantially and the 
average Herfindahl Index decreases with the size of the account balance. For example, 
households with portfolio balances exceeding $100,000 own on average 11.7 stocks and have a 
Herfindahl Index of 0.33, with 7.5 percent of the households concentrating all of their portfolio 
in one stock. 
The aggregate holdings of households in the sample differ from the market portfolio. 
Households tend to overweight local stocks and stocks not included in the S&P 500 Index. 
Slightly more than one-half of the holdings are held in stocks included in the S&P 500 Index, 
while the S&P 500 Index stocks represent around two-thirds of the total market capitalization of 
the U.S. stock market during the sample period. One-seventh of the holdings are held in stocks of 
companies headquartered less than 50 miles away from the respective households’ residences, a 
figure substantially higher than the fraction that would be observed if individuals invested in the 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Blume and Friend (1975), Kelly (1995), Barber and Odean (2000), and Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2001).    8
market portfolio.
8 The portfolios of wealthier households correspond more closely to the market 
portfolio, but the bias towards local, non-S&P 500 stocks persists. 
B. Persistence of Concentration Levels 
To assess the persistence of our concentration measure, we compute the average 
Herfindahl Index over the following six years for households that initially held exactly one stock 
and therefore had an initial Herfindahl Index of one. The Herfindahl Index decreases on average 
to 0.79 after one year and to 0.69 after six years. These concentration measures remain above the 
unconditional average Herfindahl Index of 0.62 in our sample. The persistence is substantially 
stronger for households with initial portfolio values exceeding $100,000. The Herfindahl Index 
of households that initially own one stock decreases to 0.85 after one year and to 0.79 after six 
years, which is substantially larger than the average Herfindahl Index of 0.33 for these wealthy 
households. We obtain similar results if we compute the correlation of Herfindahl Indices for the 
same household over time. 
The persistence in portfolio concentration could reflect buy-and-hold investors who 
simply continue to hold their initial stock position. However, the concentration levels remain 
very high even for households that have substantial portfolio turnover. We compute the average 
Herfindahl Indices at different time horizons for households that own initially one stock and that 
make at least ten stock transactions during each year. The average Herfindahl Index equals 0.48 
after one year and 0.40 after six years, indicating that even the households with substantial 
turnover remain concentrated in a relatively small number of stocks. Again, the persistence is 
even stronger for larger portfolios. Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2002) find strong 
persistence in the performance of individual investors’ trades. The strong persistence in portfolio 
concentration, if coupled with superior returns to concentrated investments, offers a potential 
explanation for their finding. 
C. Comparison with Survey of Consumer Finances 
To gauge the extent to which our discount brokerage sample is representative of the 
overall population of U.S. individual investors, we compare some of their major portfolio 
characteristics with the portfolio characteristics of the general population. Given our aim to study 
                                                 
8 See Zhu (2002) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2004).   9
the relation between the concentration of a household’s portfolio and its performance, it is useful 
to assess whether the stock holdings in the brokerage account likely represent a large or small 
portion of a household’s overall portfolio. Table II compares basic household portfolio 
characteristics from our sample with total household portfolio characteristics from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is conducted every three years 
and collects balance sheet, pension, income, and other demographic characteristics of a sample 
of U.S. households.
9 It reports the number of stocks held in households’ taxable accounts and 
their total portfolio value. For direct comparison, we report stock holdings in taxable accounts 
for our brokerage house sample. The SCF over-samples wealthy households because these 
households own a disproportionate fraction of the financial assets; accordingly, we use the 
provided population weights to compute the distribution of the wealth and diversification levels.  
We compare the characteristics of our discount brokerage sample from December 1992 
with the 1992 SCF in Panel A and our sample in November 1996 with the 1998 SCF in Panel B. 
In December 1992, the average account balance of households in our sample was $44,707, while 
the average account balance of the SCF households holding equity in a taxable account was 
$66,810. On the other hand, the median household in our sample has a higher account balance 
($13,869) than the median household in the SCF ($8,000), with the 75
th percentile of account 
balances being fairly close ($35,604 in discount brokerage sample and $30,000 in SCF). 
Conditioning on a stock portfolio of at least $100,000, the median stock holdings of $181,355 in 
the sample corresponds very closely with the median of $181,000 in the SCF, with the inter-
quartile range also similar across the two groups. Panel B shows that account balances are larger 
during the latter time period. For all but the largest stock portfolios, the distribution of account 
balances at the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles for the discount broker sample matches the 
distribution for the general population fairly well. 
The distribution of the number of stocks in our discount brokerage sample also closely 
resembles the distribution in the SCF. Households in the discount brokerage sample owned on 
average 4.3 stocks in December 1992 and households in the 1992 SCF sample owned on average 
4.0 stocks; in the latter period the average number of stocks held is 5.1 and 5.7 stocks, 
respectively. This indicates that that the diversification of households’ complete stock portfolios, 
as measured by the SCF sample, is not substantially different from the diversification of the 
                                                 
9 See Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1994) for a detailed description of the SCF data set.   10
stock portfolios held by households in the discount brokerage house sample. Overall, there is a 
close match between the two samples along several important portfolio characteristics. 
D. Summary Statistics for Trades 
Table III describes some summary statistics for the individual investors’ stock 
transactions during the sample period. The complete sample includes 640,070 buy transactions 
and 552,832 sell transactions of common stocks made by households that had stock holdings at 
the end of the prior year (needed to construct concentration levels and portfolio-value cutoffs). 
We compute the performance of the trades for households with various portfolio values. In 
addition to our usual portfolio-value cutoffs, we also include summary statistics for households 
with a stock portfolio less than $25,000 at the end of the prior year, because they typically make 
substantially smaller trades. Households with portfolio values above $100,000 account for nine 
percent of the households in the sample, but they account for 28 percent of the transactions, 
while households with portfolios less than $25,000 constitute about two-thirds of the households, 
but just over one-third of the trades. The size of the purchase and the sale transactions is related 
to the total portfolio value. The average stock purchase is $5,665 for households with portfolios 
less than $25,000 and $19,453 for households with portfolio values of at least $100,000. 
Individual investors disproportionately favor trading local stocks and the stocks not 
included in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. Only about 40 percent of transactions involve the 
stocks included in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index and around 15 percent of the transactions 
involve the stocks of firms headquartered within 50 miles of the investor. The last two rows of 
Table III summarize the excess returns of the purchases and the sales during the subsequent year. 
The excess returns are computed by subtracting the appropriate Fama and French (1992) 
benchmark portfolio return formed according to size and book-to-market deciles from the raw 
returns. Consistent with Odean (1999), we find that the stocks purchased perform on average 
worse than the stocks sold
10 for all portfolio-value cutoffs. However, the underperformance is 
more substantial for the households with the smallest portfolio values. The stocks purchased by 
all households have an average excess return of –1.6 percent during the year following the 
purchase, while the stocks sold by all households have an average excess return of 0.2 percent, 
                                                 
10 Odean (1999) finds that stocks purchased by individual investors have an average return of 5.69 percent and 
stocks sold have an average return of 9.00 percent in the year after the transaction. Odean attributes the result to 
individual investors tending to be overconfident and trading excessively.   11
resulting in a performance differential of –1.8 percent over the year following a purchase relative 
to a sell. For portfolios of at least $100,000, the difference in average one-year returns (purchases 
minus sales) is –0.9 percent.  The difference in median returns following purchases and sales is 
similar.  
E. Portfolio and Trade Characteristics by Portfolio Concentration 
Table IV compares the characteristics of the trades made by households that own only 
one stock at the beginning of the year (i.e., completely concentrated households) with the 
characteristics of the trades made by households that own more than one stock. For various 
subsamples defined by portfolio size, we summarize the characteristics of household portfolios 
holding more than one stock in the first column and show the difference between the two groups 
of portfolios in the second column.  
One issue related to this dataset is that the investors whose common-stock investments 
are concentrated might hold well-diversified mutual funds through the same broker or they might 
be well diversified by holding other securities in their accounts with other brokers or though 
other investment channels. While we cannot completely rule out the latter possibility, the 
comparison of our sample with the SCF samples (see Section I.C) suggests that the summary 
statistics associated with household investments held through this broker are very close to those 
of the SCF samples. In regard to the possibility that investors concentrated in common stocks 
might be well-diversified through mutual funds or other securities, we find that concentrated 
households are significantly less likely to hold other asset classes in their accounts with this 
brokerage house. Panel A of Table IV shows that 53.3 percent of diversified households and 33.5 
percent of concentrated households own other asset classes in their accounts with this broker. 
While the fraction of households with diversified stock portfolios that hold other types of assets 
rises with the size of the stock portfolio (from 48.7% for households with stock portfolios less 
than $25,000 to 70.8% for households with stock portfolios of at least $100,000), the fraction of 
households with concentrated stock portfolios that hold other types of assets actually declines 
with the size of the stock portfolio (from 35.4% for households with stock portfolios less than 
$25,000 to 21.8% for households with the largest stock portfolios of at least $100,000). Thus, 
households with concentrated stock holdings are no more likely to invest into other asset classes   12
at this brokerage house than are households with diversified stock holdings, and in fact are less 
likely to do so. 
Panel B of Table IV reports the characteristics of total stock transactions for concentrated 
and diversified households. While 55.6 percent of diversified households purchase at least one 
stock in a given year, the same is true for only 32.5 percent of concentrated households. 
Moreover, the number of purchases is significantly lower for concentrated households than for 
diversified households even after conditioning on having at least one purchase in a given year.  
The median total value of annual common-stock purchases made by the diversified 
households that made any common-stock purchases is $13,375. The value of the purchases 
increases significantly with the total household portfolio value at the beginning of the year. The 
median household with buy transactions in a given year tends to add funds to the account 
because the total costs of the purchases exceed the total proceeds from the sales. Concentrated 
households with relatively small initial balances (below $25,000) tend to increase their portfolio 
values by more than the diversified households. However, this tendency reverses as the account 
size increases. Specifically, the sale proceeds of the concentrated households with account values 
exceeding $100,000 are actually slightly larger than the costs of the total purchases, indicating 
that these concentrated households do not tend to add to their existing stock holdings, but rather 
use the proceeds of sales of existing positions to finance their new stock purchases. This finding 
is consistent with the persistence in concentration documented in Section I.B. 
Panel C of Table IV describes the characteristics of individual purchases. The median 
purchase for all households is just below $5,000 and does not depend significantly on the 
concentration level. Concentrated households with portfolio values of at least $25,000 tend to 
execute substantially larger but less frequent trades than diversified households. For example, the 
median individual stock purchase by a diversified household with a portfolio value of at least 
$100,000 is $9,128, while the median purchase by such a concentrated household is about three 
times larger ($27,750). Regarding the type of stocks purchased, consistent with the hypothesis 
that households may concentrate holdings in stocks among which there are likely to be larger 
informational asymmetries, concentrated households are significantly more likely to purchase 
local stocks that are not included in the S&P 500 Index. 
Thus, investors who were concentrated at the prior year-end tend to make larger 
purchases in a few stocks while diversified investors tend to make smaller purchases in a greater   13
number of stocks. Further, especially for households with sizeable portfolios, concentrated 
households in general remain concentrated because they tend to finance new purchases with the 
sales of existing positions.  
II. Performance of Trades 
In this section, we analyze whether the difference in performance between purchases and 
sales depends upon the initial concentration of the individual investors’ portfolios.
11 Upon 
finding that the trades of concentrated households perform substantially better, particularly for 
households with large accounts, we examine whether the “return to concentration” is robust to 
the inclusion of investor fixed effects and is driven by investments in stocks regarding which 
there are likely to be greater informational asymmetries. 
A. Estimation Methodology 
To determine the relation between the performance of trades and the concentration of the 
investor’s portfolio, we consider several specifications. The first specification regresses the raw 
return of stock i purchased by household h at time t during the subsequent year (Ri,h,t+1 to t+12) on 
the Herfindahl Index of the household’s portfolio at the end of the previous year (denoted as 
HIh,y-1):
12 
Ri,h,t+1  to t+12 = α + β HIh,y-1 + εi,h, t+1 to t+12, (2) 
Thus, the unit of observation is a stock purchased by a household at a specific point in 
time. The return is computed as the return during the year following the transaction.
13 The 
coefficient β represents the sensitivity of the return following the purchase, Ri,h,t+1 to t+12, to the 
initial Herfindahl Index of the portfolio (HIh,y-1). Thus, on average, the stock purchases made by 
                                                 
11 Because holdings may simply reflect inertia, and thus be less directly related to information, examining positions 
might bias the results against identifying the information content embedded in the trades made by concentrated 
investors (which reflect direct investment decisions). Nevertheless, a robustness test that we report in Section IV.D 
(Table XI) suggests that the consideration of positions still uncovers a “return to concentration.” 
12 As discussed previously, the concentration level is highly persistent. For example, the correlation between the 
Herfindahl Index values in two subsequent years is 0.79. Moreover, as shown in Table IV, concentrated households 
tend to offset the purchase of a new stock with the liquidation of an old position. 
13 When computing the return over the year following the transaction, the return calculation starts on the first day of 
the next month, ending on the last day of the 12
th month after the transaction. Hence, we will refer to the one-year 
return following the transaction as Ri,h,t+1 to t+12. This timing convention might understate the performance of skilled 
investors as excess returns might begin to accrue immediately after their transactions, an issue we address in Section 
IV.B (Table IX).   14
perfectly concentrated households (i.e., HI  = 1) would have outperformed those made by 
perfectly diversified households (i.e., HI = 0) by β percentage points the year following the 
buy.
14 Likewise, we separately estimate return regressions for the households’ sales of common 
stocks. 
We also relate the excess return of stock i bought or sold by household h at time t during 
the subsequent year (Xi,h,+1 to t+12) to the portfolio concentration of the household and to industry 
and momentum controls: 
Xi,h,t+1 to t+12 = β HIh,y-1 + γ IIi,t + δ It Ri,h,t-12 to t  + εi,h, t+1  to t+12, (3) 
The excess returns are computed by subtracting the appropriate Fama and French (1992) 
benchmark portfolios formed according to size deciles and book-to-market deciles from the raw 
stock returns Ri,h,t+1 to t+12.
15  
For this regression, the industry and momentum controls are interacted with indicator 
variables for the month of the transaction. To control for overall industry performance in the year 
following the transaction we include in the regressions the vector of industry indicator variables 
IIi,t which corresponds to the 5,183 industry-month fixed effects based on the 73 distinct two-
digit SIC codes and the 71 months a transaction could occur (from January 1991 to November 
1996). To control for momentum, we include an interaction term between the lagged one-year 
return  Ri,h,t-12 to t  and indicator variables for the 71 time periods (the coefficient vector 
δ corresponds to the 71 sensitivities of current returns to past returns). The standard errors are 
robust and take into account heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (e.g., the same 
stock being transacted in the same month by multiple investors). 
Finally, we combine the purchases and the sales by estimating two specifications—
analogously to Equations 2 and 3, one for raw returns and another for excess returns—that 
include an indicator variable for purchases (BUYi,h,t) and an interaction term between the 
purchase indicator variable and the Herfindahl Index (BUYi,h,t x HIh,y-1):  
                                                 
14 We denote households that have a Herfindahl Index of one as perfectly concentrated households and households 
that have a Herfindahl Index of zero as perfectly diversified households. Of course, households cannot literally have 
a Herfindahl Index of zero because the index ranges between 1/N and one, where N is the number of available 
securities. However, in practice, the Herfindahl Index can take on values very close to zero for portfolios consisting 
of many stocks (that is, for large N). 
15 The returns on these benchmark portfolios are obtained from Kenneth French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library.   15
Ri,h,t +1 to t+12 = α  + β0 BUYi,h,t + β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t x HIh,y-1 + εi,h, t+1  to t+12,    (4) 
 X i,h,t+1  to t+12 = β0 BUYi,h,t + β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t x HIh,y-1 + γ IIi,t + δ It Ri,h,t-12 to t  + εi,h, t+1  to t+12. (5) 
The indicator variable BUYi,h,t equals one if the corresponding transaction is a purchase 
and zero if it is a sale. The average return of a purchase made by a household with a perfectly 
diversified portfolio (HI = 0) exceeds the average return of a sale made by a household with a 
perfectly diversified portfolio by β0. The average return of a sale made by a household with a 
perfectly concentrated portfolio (HI  = 1) exceeds the average return of a sale made by a 
household with a perfectly diversified portfolio (HI = 0) by β1. The coefficient on the interaction 
term of the buy indicator variable and the Herfindahl Index of the portfolio, β2, is a key summary 
statistic of this study. It estimates the extent to which the trades (purchases and sales) made by 
concentrated households outperform those made by diversified households. Specifically, β2 
estimates the difference between (1) the difference between average performances of purchases 
and sales made by perfectly concentrated households and (2) the difference between average 
performances of purchases and sales made by perfectly diversified households. The coefficient 
β2 can be interpreted as a measure of the “return to concentration.”  
While sales of stock can be motivated by information, they can also be the result of 
liquidity needs and tax considerations (e.g., tax-loss selling in December or before the asset loses 
short-term holding period status). Stock purchases, on the other hand, are not a result of the latter 
two motivations, and thus are more likely to reflect the investors’ financial sophistication. 
Moreover, sales could be motivated by the “disposition effect” (i.e., loss-aversion, Odean 
(1998)), a tendency to sell good performers and retain poor performers in the portfolio.
16 Thus, 
by excluding the sale decisions and only capturing the difference in performance of the stock 
purchases made by concentrated investors and the stock purchases made by diversified investors, 
an alternative “return to concentration” measure (the sum β1 + β2, labeled as “Herfindahl + Buy 
indicator * Herfindahl” in the tables) captures precisely the transactions most likely to be based 
                                                 
16 Assume, for example, that concentrated investors are good stock pickers, and that their sales are motivated by the 
disposition effect. If the good performers that are sold continue to perform well after the sale, that would bias against 
finding a return to concentration as the concentrated investor that makes good stock picks would also sell stocks that 
will likely continue to perform well.   16
on asymmetric information and, at the same time, the least likely to be affected by other 
considerations. 
B. Estimation Results 
The one-year returns following purchases and sales made by individual investors with 
varying levels of concentration are summarized in Table V. Panel A of Table V summarizes the 
regression coefficients on the portfolio Herfindahl Index for the purchases of stocks for various 
samples of households. For each sample, the first column corresponds to the first specification 
using raw returns (Equation 2) and the second column corresponds to the second specification 
using excess returns relative to the Fama-French size and book-to-market decile portfolios and 
controlling for momentum and industry effects (Equation 3). Focusing first on the raw-return 
results, the coefficient estimate associated with the Herfindahl Index is significantly positive for 
households with initial portfolio values of at least $25,000, with the relation between 
concentration and performance strengthening for households with larger accounts. For 
households with smaller initial portfolios (i.e., less than $25,000), there is no significant 
difference in the performance of purchases with respect to household portfolio concentration. For 
example, in keeping with the interpretation of the coefficients on the Herfindahl Index as the 
total effect of concentration on trade performance when comparing a perfectly concentrated 
investor (Herfindahl Index of one) to a perfectly diversified investor (Herfindahl Index of zero), 
stocks purchased by perfectly concentrated households outperform stocks purchased by perfectly 
diversified households by 2.3 percent per year in the sample of households with portfolio values 
of at least $25,000. The return differential further increases to 3.9 percent among households 
with account balances of at least $100,000.  
The second columns associated with the respective samples in Panel A correspond to the 
coefficient estimates after controlling for various risk, industry, and style characteristics. With 
the exception of the sample of households with stock portfolios less than $25,000, all coefficients 
associated with the Herfindahl Index are significantly different from zero at the one percent 
level. For example, among households with portfolios of at least $25,000, purchases made by 
concentrated investors outperform those made by diversified investors by 2.9 percentage points 
over the course of the year following the purchase. This percentage grows to 3.7 for households 
with portfolios of at least $100,000.     17
Panel B reports results pertaining to stock sales, which indicate that, unlike stock 
purchases, there is no significant relation between concentration and performance following the 
transactions. This asymmetry of purchases and sales in regard to the relation between 
concentration and returns likely reflects the notion that sales can be driven by many factors other 
than information about the stock’s prospects, such as liquidity needs, taxes, and portfolio 
rebalancing. Besides, investors can only sell the stocks they already own.
17 In contrast, no such 
limitations apply to stock purchases. Therefore, purchases made by concentrated investors on 
average likely contain more information about a stock’s prospects than their sales. 
Finally, Panel C combines the purchases and the sales. The first column reports the 
coefficient estimates based on the specification from Equation 4 and the second column reports 
the estimates based on the specification from Equation 5. The coefficient on the buy indicator, 
β0, is significantly negative for all specifications and remains remarkably stable for various 
household portfolio sizes. On average, the buys made by perfectly diversified investors 
underperform the sales by 2.1 percent per year using raw returns and by 1.6 percent after the risk, 
industry, and style adjustments. These estimates are consistent with Odean’s (1999) results that 
individual investors’ purchases underperform their sales. The coefficient on the Herfindahl 
Index,  β1, is not significantly different from zero, confirming our previous result that the 
performance of the sales does not differ between concentrated and diversified households. 
We find that the coefficient on the interaction term of the buy indicator variable and the 
Herfindahl Index of the portfolio, β2, is positive and significantly different from zero for all but 
the households with the smallest portfolios. Thus, the differential performance following 
purchases relative to sales is consistently higher for concentrated households: controlling for 
risk, industry, and style, the differential performance following purchases relative to sales for 
concentrated households is 80 basis points per year higher than that for diversified households, 
rising to a difference of 2.4 percentage points for investors with portfolios of at least $25,000 and 
4.8 percentage points for those with portfolios of at least $100,000. Thus, the trades of 
concentrated investors perform significantly better than those of their more diversified 
counterparts. 
Panel C of Table V also reports an alternative measure of the return to concentration, 
namely the sum β1 + β2, which measures the performance of purchases made by perfectly 
                                                 
17 A potential exception would be short sales. However, very few investors in the sample place short sales.    18
concentrated households relative to purchases made by perfectly diversified households. This 
measure tends to be positive in the analyses based on the sample of all households, though the 
magnitude of the coefficient is only statistically significant for the specification including 
controls for risk, industry, and style (coefficient estimate of 90 basis points per year). However, 
for larger account sizes, the difference in the performance following stock purchases across 
concentration levels increases substantially: depending on the specification, households with 
portfolio values of at least $25,000 are associated with performance differentials of 2.3-2.9 
percentage points per year, whereas the purchases of concentrated investors outperform those of 
diversified investors by almost four percentage points or households with portfolio values of at 
least $100,000. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that some households, 
particularly wealthy ones, have informational advantages that induce them to hold concentrated 
portfolios.
18, 19 
C. Controlling for Investors’ Average Stock-Picking Abilities 
A concern with any cross-sectional analysis is that some omitted household-specific 
attribute can explain the observed correlation (in this case between the concentration of investor 
portfolios and the performance of an investor’s trades). To control for investor-specific attributes 
such as financial sophistication, we augment the previous specifications with household-level 
fixed effects. For example, we estimate the specifications based upon Equations (4) and (5) that 
also include fixed effects for each household as follows: 
                                                 
18 Throughout the paper, we use the Herfindahl Index of the household’s stock portfolio at the end of the prior year 
as our primary measure of concentration. An alternative concentration measure, such as the inverse of the number of 
stocks in the portfolio, yields very similar results. For example, the trades of perfectly concentrated households 
outperform those of perfectly diversified households by 2.4 percentage points using the Herfindahl Index measure 
and by 2.3 percentage points using the inverse of the number of stocks measure, with the comparable estimates 4.8 
and 4.7, respectively, for the households with the largest portfolios. 
19 We also run Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions to test whether the results are robust in the various cross-sections. 
Focusing on households with stock portfolios of at least $25,000, the time-series mean (median) of the differences in 
the performance of the trades across the two investor groups (β2) is 2.7 (2.0) percentage points and is highly 
statistically significant. The trades made by perfectly concentrated households perform better than the trades made 
by perfectly diversified households in 51 of the 71 cross-sections.
  We also consider our alternative return to 
concentration measure, the difference in the one-year excess returns following purchases for concentrated investors 
relative to diversified investors (again focusing on households with portfolios of at least $25,000). The distribution 
of this alternative measure is very similar to the prior one, with a time-series average (median) of 3.5 (2.5) 
percentage points. Further, the purchases made by perfectly concentrated households perform better than those made 
by perfectly diversified households over the following year in 54 of the 71 cross-sections. Thus, both return to 
concentration measures appear to be a stable phenomenon in that they do no appear to be driven by unusually high 
returns in relatively few time periods. 
   19
Ri,h,t+1  to t+12 = β1 HIh,t-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,t-1 + µ Ih BUYh +  η Ih SELLh + εi,h, t+1  to t+12                      (6) 
Xi,h,t+1 to t+12 = β1HIh,t-1 + β2BUYi,h,tHIh,t-1 + γΙIi,t + δItRi,h,t-12 to t +µIhBUYh + ηIhSELLh +εi,h, t+1 to t+12,   (7) 
where Ih BUYh and  Ih SELLh denote that separate household fixed effects are included for buys 
and sales, thus controlling for the average stock-picking ability (both for purchases and sales) of 
the household. The buy indicator variable, BUYi,h,t, is not included in the regression by itself, as it 
is absorbed in the household fixed effects. 
Assuming that the availability of relevant information and/or the information processing 
skills of investors are limited, households may be better off investing in a subset of the limited 
number of stocks with informational asymmetries. Expanding the portfolio beyond this limited 
subset into additional stocks will likely depress portfolio performance, either because the stocks 
about which one may possess superior information have already been tapped or because the 
increasing number of different investments lessens one’s ability to effectively monitor any of 
them. The specification that includes fixed effects is suitable for testing this hypothesis. 
Results are presented in Table VI. The first two columns replicate the first two columns 
from Table V, whereas the last two columns present estimates based on specifications that 
include fixed effects. The full sample consists of 52,661 households. All the returns are 
expressed in percentage points. In short, all the major conclusions from Table V hold. Both 
measures of the return to concentration (Panel C, Table VI) are large and positive—in fact, they 
are even larger than the estimates based on specifications that do not include household fixed 
effects. For example, the return to concentration is estimated at 2.4 – 2.7 percentage points in the 
excess return specification. The strong return to concentration results obtained from fixed-effect 
specifications constitute a particularly compelling result because they suggest that, even after 
controlling for a household’s average investment ability, the household’s trades perform better as 
the household’s portfolio includes fewer stocks. 
D. Interactions with Measures of Asymmetric Information 
Having demonstrated that the trades of concentrated households performed significantly 
better than the trades of diversified households, in this section we investigate whether this result 
can be explained by informational asymmetries. For example, Ivković and Weisbenner (2004) 
suggest that asymmetric information among investors is more prevalent for stocks that are local 
to the households and are less apt to be widely known (i.e., not included in the S&P 500 Index),   20
and, similar to individuals, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that mutual fund managers’ local 
investments also outperform their non-local investments. It follows that the return to 
concentration could be the strongest for these types of stocks. 
Table VII reports the estimated excess returns for the trades of perfectly concentrated and 
perfectly diversified households under the specification from Equation 5 (i.e., excess returns with 
industry-month and momentum controls). The first column reports the excess returns of the 
trades for all households with a known location. These estimates differ slightly from the base-
case results in Table V because those results include households with and without known 
locations. The next four columns report one-year excess returns following trades of S&P 500 
stocks, non-S&P 500 stocks, local stocks (i.e., the company headquarters is located within 50 
miles of the household), and non-local stocks. The final four columns report returns based on the 
various interactions of the S&P 500 status and locality of the stock. We observe larger 
differences between the excess returns of trades of perfectly concentrated and diversified 
households for stocks that are not included in the S&P 500 Index (the third column) and are local 
to the household (the fourth column). For example, for all households with a known location, the 
trades of concentrated households outperform those of diversified households by 1.4 percentage 
points per year. However, focusing on the transactions of non-S&P 500 stocks, the difference in 
the performance of trades is 2.4 percentage points, and focusing on the transactions of local 
stocks, the trades of concentrated households outperform those of diversified households by 5.0 
percentage points.  
The superior performance of the trades made by concentrated investors is particularly 
pronounced for local stocks excluded from the S&P 500 Index (the eighth column), amounting to 
6.9 percentage points for the sample of all households, thus indicating that exploiting 
informational asymmetries may play an important role in the return to concentration. Subsequent 
rows of the table suggest that the performance differential increases with the size of the 
household portfolio: from 6.9 percentage points for all households to more than 10 percentage 
points for households with larger portfolios—specifically, 13 percentage points for the sample of 
portfolios of at least $25,000.  
Thus, the “return to locality” for individual investors documented by Ivković and 
Weisbenner (2004) seems to be driven by the performance of the local investments made by 
concentrated investors. That said, concentrated investors still possess stock-picking skill in the   21
realm of non-local stocks, as the trades of non-S&P 500, non-local stocks by concentrated 
investors outperform those of diversified investors by 1.7 percentage points. On the other hand, 
among investments in S&P 500 stocks, which have much greater analyst coverage and national 
media attention, there is no difference in the performance of the trades of concentrated versus 
diversified investors across all portfolio-value cutoffs. 
III. Alternative Explanations 
The results of Section II suggest that the trades of concentrated investors perform 
significantly better than those of diversified investors, with the difference being particularly 
striking when the comparison is made across households with large portfolios. While consistent 
with the hypothesis that concentrated investors, particularly those with large portfolios, are better 
stock pickers, this finding could also potentially be attributed to alternative explanations such as 
differences across the two groups of investors in the access to and exploitation of inside 
information, the turnover in households’ stock portfolios, and the volatility of transacted stocks. 
In this section we examine and rule out these alternative explanations. 
A. Relating Return to Concentration to Timing the Market, Exploiting Inside Information, and 
Holding Non-Stock Assets 
In this section we consider three groups of alternative explanations for the return to 
concentration. First, we assess the possibility that strong returns to concentration stem from the 
concentrated investors’ ability to time the overall market or its particular sector rather than from 
concentrated investors’ stock-picking ability. Second, we test whether the return to concentration 
is driven by households transacting in the same stock over time, which could be consistent with 
receiving inside information. Finally, we also consider how returns to concentration differ across 
household portfolios with and without other non-common stock assets (e.g., mutual funds and 
bonds).  
We report the differential returns following trades (buy returns minus sale returns) of 
perfectly concentrated investors relative to diversified investors (β2) for various samples in Table 
VIII. The first row replicates results from Table V for the full sample across various portfolio-
value cutoffs.  In the second and third rows we replace the actual one-year return of the stocks 
bought and sold with either the return of the market (second row) or the return of the appropriate   22
Fama-French portfolio formed based on size and book-to-market deciles (third row). This 
enables us to tell whether the performance of the trades of concentrated investors is attributable 
to specific stock-picking ability or to broader market timing.  The results suggest the former, as 
the market and the appropriate Fama-French portfolio perform slightly worse following the 
trades of concentrated households relative to those of diversified households. Thus, the return to 
concentration is driven by concentrated investors transacting in the right stocks, rather than by 
timing the broad equity market. 
In the next three rows (rows (4) through (6)), we exclude the stock(s) that represented the 
largest dollar-purchase or sale, the stock(s) that had the largest return following a purchase or the 
smallest return following a sale, and the stock(s) that had the greatest number of purchases or 
sales, respectively. All three screens serve as possible indicators that the individual has access to 
inside information for this particular stock, with the last exclusion similar to that made by Coval, 
Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2002). In each case, we not only exclude the particular transaction 
that was the largest in value or had the largest return, but we also drop any other household 
transactions involving that stock. Since we do this both for purchases and sales, at most the 
transactions involving two distinct stocks will be excluded from the sample for each household. 
These exclusions do reduce the return to concentration, however it still remains at about one-half 
to four-fifths of its original size for households with sizeable portfolios (i.e., at least $25,000). 
For example, focusing on households with portfolios of at least $100,000, the differential return 
of trades for concentrated households exceeds that for diversified households by 3.1 to 4.0 
percentage points per year across the samples in which we exclude certain stock transactions, 
compared to 4.8 percentage points estimated over all trades. Thus, the superior performance of 
the concentrated investments in large portfolios is not predominantly attributable to the 
concentrated households transacting in the same stock over time.  This result suggests that 
simply exploiting inside information is not likely the source of the return to concentration, but, 
rather, that households holding sizeable, concentrated portfolios have broader stock-picking 
ability. 
In the last two rows (rows (7) and (8)), we assess whether investment ability differs 
across households with and without other non-stock assets (e.g., mutual funds and bonds). 
Clearly, a concentrated stock investment has a larger consequence for a household whose 
portfolio consists only of that stock than if the portfolio also consists of a broad-based equity   23
mutual fund. Presumably, rational investors would not concentrate their entire portfolio in one or 
a few stocks unless they are very confident in their investment ability and the quality of the 
information they acquired. On the other hand, if such undiversified investments are the 
manifestation of overconfidence, then the trades of these households will not earn excess returns.  
Results presented in the last two rows of Table VIII suggest that there clearly is a 
“courage in your convictions” effect, as the return to concentration documented throughout this 
paper is concentrated in the group of investors that do not hold assets other than common stocks 
with this brokerage house. Estimated over the full sample, there is no difference between the 
performance of trades among households with concentrated stock portfolios and those with 
diversified stock portfolios if the households also hold other non-stock assets. However, the 
trades made by concentrated households outperform those made by diversified households by 2.1 
percentage points for the sample of households that only own stocks, with the performance of the 
trades increasing in the size of the portfolio. The difference in the return to concentration 
between the sample of investors that do not hold other assets and those that do is two to four 
percentage points and is significant across the full sample as well as the subsamples of investors 
with large portfolios. Thus, it appears that households that have superior information concerning 
a stock act upon this information by not only tilting their stock portfolio towards it, but by 
concentrating the bulk of their holdings (at least with this brokerage house) into this stock. 
B. Household Portfolio Turnover 
Table IV shows that concentrated investors purchase new stocks with a lower frequency 
than diversified investors. This may suggest that diversified investors have greater portfolio 
turnover than their concentrated counterparts. Barber and Odean (2000) find that “trading is 
hazardous to your wealth,” that is, that households with greater portfolio turnover tend to earn 
lower returns. Thus, if the turnover of its portfolio is negatively related to the concentration of its 
portfolio, the return to concentration may not reflect investor stock-picking skill, but instead may 
simply be an artifact of the differential turnover across the two groups of households.  
To address this issue, we calculate the average annual household portfolio turnover, 
defined as the average of the total buys and the total sales the household made during the year 
divided by the total portfolio balance at the beginning of the year (very similar to the turnover 
measure constructed by Barber and Odean (2000)). Across all households, the median annual   24
portfolio turnover of concentrated investors (defined here as those holding one stock) is 4.1 
percentage points lower than that for diversified investors. However, focusing on households 
with common-stock portfolios of at least $25,000, the difference in annual turnover shrinks to 
1.1 percent across the two groups (and disappears all together among households with common-
stock portfolios of at least $100,000), reflecting the offsetting effects of a lower propensity to 
purchase stocks with a higher transaction value conditional upon trade on the turnover of 
concentrated households relative to the turnover of diversified households. 
In unreported analyses, we conduct a “horse race” between portfolio concentration on the 
one hand and average portfolio turnover on the other hand by re-estimating an augmented 
version of Equation 5 with two additional regressors: the household’s average annual portfolio 
turnover over the sample, and an interaction of that term with the Buy indicator. The stocks 
purchased by households with higher average portfolio turnover over the sample performed 
worse than the stocks bought by households with low turnover, consistent with Barber and 
Odean (2000). The inclusion of the household’s average portfolio turnover, while significant in it 
own right, does not diminish the return to concentration.
20 For example, our primary return to 
concentration measure, β2, is 0.8 percentage points across the sample of all trades made by all 
households both with and without portfolio turnover controls, and changes little for the sample of 
trades made by households with the largest portfolios (4.8 percentage points without turnover 
controls and 4.7 with turnover controls).
21 This reflects that turnover is not that different between 
concentrated and diversified investors (particularly those with larger accounts); households with 
diversified-stock holdings tend to transact more than concentrated investors do, however, the 
trades of concentrated investors are larger, resulting in similar turnover levels. 
C. Stock Volatility 
Throughout the paper we report simple arithmetic returns. A potential concern with the 
return to concentration is that it could be a manifestation of concentrated households investing in 
riskier stocks (i.e., those with greater volatility). It is well known that if stock returns are log-
normally distributed, then two stocks with the same average logarithmic returns will have 
                                                 
20 Including the household’s turnover during the year preceding the transaction, rather than the average of the 
household’s annual portfolio turnover throughout the sample, does not effect the relation between trade performance 
and portfolio concentration. However, the turnover coefficients are now smaller in magnitude and insignificant. 
21 Including household portfolio turnover during the year preceding the transaction also does not diminish the 
estimated return to concentration in specifications with investor fixed effects.   25
different simple arithmetic returns if their standard deviations differ (higher volatility leads to a 
higher average arithmetic return). In this case, the higher-volatility investments held by 
concentrated investors would mechanically have higher average one-year simple arithmetic 
returns, even if these investors had no investing skill relative to diversified households, just by 
virtue of the right-skewness of the return distribution.  
The purchases of concentrated households (defined in this case as those holding only one 
stock) do have a higher monthly volatility that those of diversified households, however the 
difference is slight (13.1 vs. 12.5 for all households and 12.8 vs. 12.0 for households with 
accounts of at least $100,000). However, concentrated households are also more apt to sell 
slightly more volatile stocks as well (13.1 vs. 12.4 for all households and 12.5 vs. 11.8 for 
households with the accounts of at least $100,000). Given that our primary return to 
concentration measure is the differential performance of trades (performance of purchases minus 
performance of sales) across the two investor-types, the level of volatility should not 
mechanically affect this difference in returns. Since both the stocks bought and sold have the 
same volatility on average for both groups of investors, any bias in arithmetic returns is 
effectively differenced out. 
Nonetheless, to test for this potential alternative explanation for the return to 
concentration we conduct a “horse race” between portfolio concentration and volatility of the 
transacted stock. In unreported analyses, we re-estimate Equation 5 with the addition of the 
monthly volatility over the past 24 months and an interaction of that term with the Buy indicator. 
Including the volatility of the transacted-stock in the return regression actually has little effect on 
the return to concentration, suggesting that focusing on the differential performance of trades 
across investor groups mitigates any potential bias in average raw returns that can result from 
greater volatility.  
Yet another way to address the potential role volatility can play in boosting the mean 
simple return is to use logarithmic returns instead of simple raw returns in the regression. In 
unreported analyses we find that a regression using log returns instead of regular raw returns 
estimates that, among portfolios of at least $100,000, the differential performance following 
purchases relative to sales for concentrated households is 3.3 percentage points per year higher 
than that for diversified households, a figure similar to the 4.4 percent estimated with simple 
returns (as presented in Table V).   26
IV. Further Robustness Tests 
Building upon the results of the previous sections, we conduct several other robustness 
tests including exploring alternative measures of concentration, considering alternative 
investment horizons, and aggregating the trades and the positions of concentrated and diversified 
investors to conduct a portfolio analysis. The section concludes with a discussion of the risk-
return tradeoff of the concentrated investment strategies employed by some of the investors in 
our sample. 
A. Alternative Specifications and Concentration Measures 
We begin this section by reporting on the results using four alternative specifications. The 
first focuses on transactions above $10,000, the second weights each observation by the total 
value of the transaction, the third replaces the Herfindahl Index with the inverse of the number of 
stocks held in the household portfolio, and the fourth caps the distribution of returns following 
transactions at the top one percent to test if these extreme returns affect our results. In sum, both 
measures of the return to concentration are unaffected by any of the four alternative 
specifications: the positive relation between portfolio concentration and trade performance 
remains robust both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.  For example, focusing on 
households with portfolios of at least $100,000, the trades of concentrated households 
outperform those of diversified households by 2.7 – 4.7 percentage points (depending on the 
specification), a range similar to the baseline estimate of 4.8. 
In unreported analyses, we further test whether there is a non-linear pattern between 
stock-picking ability and the concentration of the household’s portfolio. The coefficient 
estimates for the squares of the Herfindahl Index are jointly statistically significant at the ten 
percent level except for the sample of households with portfolio values exceeding $100,000 (the 
p-value is 0.12 for this specification). For any portfolio-value group, the stock returns following 
sales are concave with respect to the Herfindahl Index. The return following a sale actually starts 
to decline for households with a portfolio Herfindahl Index of 0.58 or more (for the “all 
households” regression) and a Herfindahl of 0.37 or more (for the “portfolio at least $100,000” 
regression). Focusing on the sample of portfolios of at least $100,000, the point estimate for the 
one-year return following a sale is actually negative (–1.5 percentage points) for a perfectly 
concentrated investor, indicating some market-timing ability as to when to unload stocks for this   27
group of investors. On the other hand, the stock returns following purchases are convex and tend 
to be highest at very high levels of concentration. Taking into account non-linearities in the 
relation between concentration and performance slightly increases the returns of the buys relative 
to the sales for concentrated households. 
B. Alternative Return Horizons 
The analyses reported thus far have considered one-year returns starting from the 
beginning of the month following the month of the transaction. This timing convention might 
understate the performance of skilled investors as excess returns might begin to accrue 
immediately after their transactions. To address this issue, we consider one-year returns that 
begin accruing immediately after the day of the transaction, as well as over a variety of horizons: 
one week, one month, three months, and six months. Examination of holding periods shorter than 
a year enables one to better determine whether the return to concentration accrues primarily over 
the first few days or weeks following a stock purchase, or rather accrues over a longer horizon. 
In estimating the specifications that require the computation of excess returns, we use the six 
daily Fama-French (1992) benchmarks formed according to two size and three book-to-market 
groupings (the 100 Fama-French portfolios based on size and book-to-market deciles are not 
available with daily frequency).
22 Aside from different horizons and slightly different 
computations of excess returns, the specification is quite analogous to that from Equation 5. 
The results, presented in Table IX, suggest that the return to concentration is not 
attributable to short-term individual stock-timing (i.e., excess returns do not accrue immediately 
after the transaction). Generally, returns to concentration are only detectable starting at the three-
month horizon (Panel C, Table IX) and keep increasing proportionate to the duration of the 
horizon. For example, focusing on the transactions made by all households, the trades of 
concentrated investors outperform those made by diversified investors by 30, 70, and 100 basis 
points over the first three months, six months, and one year after the transaction, respectively, 
while the differential performance of trades is 1.5, 2.9, and 5.7 percentage points over these 
horizons for households with large portfolios, respectively. This suggests that the return to 
concentration builds up gradually; it is not a consequence of some sudden burst of information 
revealed to the public shortly after the stock purchase (e.g., early access to an earnings report). In 
                                                 
22 The returns on these benchmark portfolios are also obtained from Kenneth French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library.   28
that sense, the return pattern prevailing in Table IX presents perhaps our most compelling 
evidence that the return to concentration stems from sources other than access to inside 
information.  
We also study the relation between concentration and the performance of trades using 
longer investment horizons. In unreported results, we find that the magnitude of the differential 
performance following purchases relative to sales tends to increase with the investment horizon, 
but the estimates are no longer statistically significance beyond the three-year horizon. 
C. Portfolio Analysis of Trades  
In this section we provide an alternative test of whether the trades of concentrated 
investors outperform the trades of diversified investors. In particular, we aggregate the trades 
made by concentrated and diversified investors into portfolios to test whether the trades (i.e., 
return following purchases minus return following sales) made by concentrated households 
outperform those placed by diversified households. Thus, loosely speaking, this portfolio return 
is the analog of β2, the return to concentration, from Equation 5. Similar to Table VII, for various 
subsamples—trades in all stocks, trades in stocks classified according to their S&P 500 Index 
membership status, trades in stocks characterized by the distance between the household and the 
corporate headquarters, as well as the interactions of the latter two criteria—we form zero-cost 
portfolios and evaluate their performance.  Given we can no longer employ a continuous 
measure of concentration in the portfolio analysis (i.e., we need to categorize households as 
either concentrated or diversified), we define a concentrated investor as one with a portfolio 
Herfindahl Index of at least 0.5 at the prior year-end.
23 A stock transaction is kept in the 
appropriate portfolio (buy/sale, concentrated/diversified) for 12 months, starting with the first 
full calendar month after the trade date, with transactions weighted by their value. 
We compute raw and abnormal returns of various portfolios. The abnormal monthly 
returns are computed using Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, which accounts for the three 
Fama-French (1993) factors (market, size, and book-to-market factors), as well as the fourth 
momentum factor. We estimate the following regression: 
Ri,t – RF, t = αi + βi,M (RM,t – RF,t) + βi,S SMBt + βi,V HMLt + βi,m MOMt + ei,t,      (8) 
                                                 
23 We also consider other thresholds for the definition of a concentrated investor, such as a portfolio Herfindahl 
Index of 1.0 or at least 0.33, and obtain qualitatively similar results.   29
where the dependent variable is the return on portfolio i in month t minus the risk-free rate, and 
the independent variables are given by the returns of the standard four zero-investment factor 
portfolios.
24 The intercept of the model, αi, is the Carhart measure of abnormal performance. The 
computation of standard errors follows the Newey-West correction and takes into account 
autocorrelation up to three lags. 
Table X presents the results. Both panels in the table (pertaining to all households and to 
households with portfolios of at least $100,000 at the prior year-end, respectively) confirm that 
the conclusions obtained with the pooled cross-sectional regressions in the prior tables also hold 
with the portfolio analysis. In particular, focusing on the sample of all trades made by all 
households, both the cross-sectional regression (Table V, second column) as well as the portfolio 
analysis (Table X, first column) suggest that the trades of concentrated investors outperform 
those of diversified investors by 0.8 percentage points on an annual basis. The portfolio results 
also confirm that the return to concentration is primarily attributable to non-S&P 500 stocks 
(third column), as well as stocks local to the household (fourth column). Moreover, the 
intersection of these two criteria, presented in the eighth column, yields by far the strongest 
returns to concentration. For all households (Panel A), the risk-adjusted return is 59 basis points 
per month (7.3 percentage points annualized), comparable to the 6.9 estimated in the cross-
sectional regression (Table VII, eighth column). Again, the return to concentration measure is 
stronger for households with large portfolios, estimated at 23 basis points per month (2.8 
percentage points annualized), compared with the 4.8 estimated in the cross-sectional regression 
(Table V, eighth column).
25 
We also consider the returns to a zero-cost portfolio that consists of purchases made by 
concentrated households on the long side of the portfolio and purchases made by diversified 
households on the short side of the portfolio. This zero-cost portfolio is a close equivalent of the 
alternative measure of the return to concentration (i.e., β1 + β2). In unreported analyses, we find 
                                                 
24 RMt – RFt is the excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate. The market returns RMt are calculated 
as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks using the CRSP database. The monthly 
return of the one-month Treasury bill rate is obtained from Ibbotson Associates. SMB is the return difference 
between small and large capitalization stocks. HML is the return difference between high and low book-to-market 
stocks, and MOM is the return difference between stocks with high and low past returns. The size, value, and 
momentum factor returns are taken from Kenneth French’s website:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library. 
25 Other thresholds for the definition of a concentrated investor, such as a portfolio Herfindahl Index of 1.0 or at 
least 0.33, yield an estimate of the return to concentration of 28 basis points and 17 basis points per month for the 
households with large portfolios, respectively (with both estimates significant at the 10 percent level).   30
that essentially all of the differential performance of trades is attributable to the purchases of 
concentrated investors outperforming those of diversified investors, with no differential in the 
performance following stock sales. 
D. Portfolio Analysis of Positions  
We explore the information content of not only the trades investors explicitly made, but 
also the implicit investment decisions associated with continuing to hold the existing 
investments. Toward that goal, we form and compute excess returns from a portfolio consisting 
of the accumulated holdings of households with concentrated investments and contrast those 
returns with the performance of a portfolio consisting of the stocks held by households with 
diversified holdings. We first form three portfolios to explore the relation between individual 
investor portfolio concentration and subsequent performance. The first portfolio—the 
“concentrated portfolio”—includes the stocks held by concentrated households, that is, those 
holding one or two stocks at the beginning of each month (the median stock ownership is two 
stocks in the sample). The second portfolio—the “diversified portfolio”—includes the stocks 
held by diversified households, that is, those holding more than two stocks at the beginning of 
each month.
26 The holdings are kept in the portfolio for one month, after which time the portfolio 
is updated with the households’ stock holdings at the end of the next month. We also compute 
the returns to a third, zero-cost portfolio that is long the concentrated portfolio and short the 
diversified portfolio. The portfolio returns are computed by value-weighting the returns of the 
individual stocks by their total value in the respective household portfolios. We form the 
portfolios based on holdings of all households, as well holdings of households with initial 
portfolio values above $100,000, to test whether the results depend upon the portfolio value. 
  The structure of the columns of Table XI is the same as that of Table X. In each panel of 
Table XI, the first row reports excess returns from zero-cost concentrated portfolios, the second 
row reports excess returns from zero-cost diversified portfolios, and the third row reports their 
differences. In essence, Table XI confirms all of the key results obtained from Table X, except 
this time the inferences are based on a much broader set of investment choices that include not 
                                                 
26 Here, we employ a concentration measure based on the number of stocks, rather than the portfolio shares, so as 
not to induce a positive correlation between the Herfindahl Index of the portfolio and subsequent household 
portfolio performance for investors that buy and hold good performers. We also consider other thresholds for the 
definition of a concentrated investor, such as holding only one stock or holding three or less, and obtain qualitatively 
similar results.   31
only trades, but also holdings. Namely, the holdings of concentrated investors outperform those 
by diversified investors by 16 basis points per month (1.9 percentage points annualized) and by 
41 basis points per month (5.0 percentage points annualized) for households with portfolios of at 
least $100,000. Consistent with the analysis of trades, the return to concentration is stronger for 
non-S&P 500 investments, as well as for investments local to the household, and is particularly 
strong for household investments in the intersection of the two categories. 
E. Risk-Return Tradeoff for Concentrated Investments 
Although we find that wealthy households holding highly concentrated portfolios 
perform significantly better on average than households holding widely diversified portfolios, we 
do not argue that investors should necessarily hold poorly diversified portfolios. Portfolio 
concentration only has benefits if the investor’s informational advantage is sufficiently large and 
if the investor is sufficiently risk tolerant. After all, high portfolio concentration leads to an 
increase in idiosyncratic risk that a risk-averse investor might not be prepared to ignore.  
To gauge the extent to which pursuing concentrated strategies affects the risk-return 
trade-off, we consider the time series of monthly household portfolios returns of the 14,702 
households that have had at least 60 months of returns over the period from February 1991 to 
December 1996.
27 We again split the sample into concentrated and diversified households. The 
identifying criterion is the average annual portfolio concentration, computed as the arithmetic 
average of the concentration measures at the beginning of each year during the sample period. 
The portfolio concentration measure used in these analyses is the inverse of the number of stocks 
in the portfolio and the threshold that separates concentrated from diversified households is 0.5.
28 
Table XII summarizes the average monthly household portfolio return, the standard 
deviation of these monthly returns, and the resulting Sharpe ratio for concentrated and diversified 
investors. The Sharpe ratio of a portfolio is defined as the ratio of the average excess monthly 
return of the portfolio above the risk-free rate divided by the standard deviation of the return of 
                                                 
27 Requiring household returns for 60 months does not bias our results. In our sample, we find no evidence that 
individual investors systematically liquidated their positions because of their underperformance. Specifically, in 
unreported analyses, we regress the probability of a household liquidating its account during the year on the 
household’s prior one-year portfolio return separately for each year. In no year was there a significantly negative 
relation between the prior portfolio return and the probability of liquidating the account. 
28 This choice of a concentration measure and the threshold effectively stipulates that the harmonic mean of the 
number of stocks held in the portfolio is two or less for concentrated households and is more than two for diversified 
households.   32
the portfolio. Panel A suggests that concentrated households’ time-series average of monthly 
returns exceeds that of the diversified households by 1.2 percentage points on an annual basis. It 
also suggests that, based on the cross-sectional distributions of returns across the two types of 
households, that portfolio performance varies quite a bit among both concentrated and 
diversified investors, although the dispersion in performance is greater among concentrated 
households. Panel B illustrates very clearly that greater concentration is associated with greater 
total portfolio risk. Indeed, the monthly standard deviations incurred by concentrated households 
exceed those incurred by diversified households by three percentage points, on average, with the 
25
th percentile level of portfolio risk for concentrated investors (5.8 percentage points) roughly 
equal to the median level of risk for diversified investors (5.5 percentage points). 
Finally, and not surprisingly in light of the results presented in Panels A and B, the risk-
return trade-off as characterized by the Sharpe ratio in Panel C suggests that the increased 
portfolio risk offsets the, on average, larger portfolio returns, resulting in a poorer risk-return 
tradeoff for concentrated households. For example, the average Sharpe ratio is 0.14 for 
concentrated investors, as compared to 0.18 for diversified investors, with the Sharpe ratio for 
diversified investors dominating that for concentrated investors at each point reported in the 
distribution.  
That said, there are limitations to the inferences that can be drawn from the Sharpe ratios 
calculated in Table XII. To assess the marginal contribution of the concentrated stock 
investments made by some households to the household’s overall risk-return profile, though, 
would require data on the overall household portfolio, including employer-sponsored retirement 
plans, real estate, and human capital. However, we can conclude that while the stock portfolios 
of concentrated households perform better on average, they do so with a higher standard 
deviation in returns. 
V. Conclusion 
  This study provides a detailed insight into the relation between portfolio concentration 
and the performance of individual investors. As found by Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean 
(2000, 2001), many individual investors make poor investment decisions (e.g., the stocks they 
purchase underperform the stocks they sell). However, our results indicate that the investments 
made by households that focus their attention on a few securities tend to perform significantly   33
better than those made by households that are diversified across many different stocks. For 
example, we find that the purchases of concentrated investors on average outperform their sales 
by a substantial margin (with the differential increasing with the size of the portfolio), while the 
purchases of more diversified investors significantly underperform their sales. Across all 
households, the stock picks of concentrated investors outperform those of diversified investors 
by about one percentage point over the year following the purchase, with the difference in 
performance growing to four percentage points for households with large portfolios (i.e., 
$100,000 or more). Moreover, the trades of concentrated households outperform the trades of 
diversified households, even after controlling for household fixed effects. This is a particularly 
compelling result, as it suggests that controlling for households’ average investment ability, 
households’ trades perform better as household portfolios include fewer stocks. The “return to 
concentration” appears to be strongest for the stocks that likely have greater informational 
asymmetries. This finding is very robust to alternative concentration measures and regression 
specifications and to alternative explanations such as differences across concentrated and 
diversified investors in the volatility of transacted stocks, portfolio turnover, and access to inside 
information.  
The correlation between the performance of trades and portfolio concentration does not 
mean that by simply altering one’s portfolio to hold just a few stocks that performance will 
improve. Rather, it suggests that some investors with superior stock-picking ability exploit their 
skills by concentrating their portfolio in a few stocks. However, while the stock investments of 
concentrated individual investors have earned excess returns, on average, these portfolios also 
have increased total risk, and thus, on average, result in a worse risk-return tradeoff than the 
stock portfolios of diversified investors. 
  Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2002) document a strong persistence in the 
performance of trades of individual investors. We show that there is strikingly strong persistence 
in the concentration of households’ portfolios over time, even among households with substantial 
turnover. The strong persistence in portfolio concentration coupled with the return to 
concentration—the key finding of our paper—offer a compelling explanation for their finding. 
Our results are also consistent with Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2004), who report that 
mutual funds that are concentrated in specific industries perform better than widely diversified   34
mutual funds. Thus, at least in the context of the performance of stock investments, it appears 
that for both individuals and professional money managers sometimes less can be more.   35
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Table I:  Summary Statistics of Distribution of Portfolio Value, Number of Stocks, and Herfindahl Index by Portfolio Size 
The table summarizes the distribution of portfolio values, the number of the stocks held, and the portfolio Herfindahl Index for 
households with portfolios of various sizes. The Herfindahl Index is defined as HIh = ∑(wh,i)
2 (where wh,i is the weight of stock i held 
by household h at time t). The table also reports the proportion of households holding only one stock and the proportion of portfolios 
invested in S&P 500 and local stocks (i.e., stocks of corporations headquartered within 50 miles from the household). 



















Mean 45,604 3.9 0.62 119,130 7.0 0.43 322,035 11.7 0.33
(std. dev.)  (234,902) (5.2) (0.33) (398,442) (7.7) (0.31) (744,697) (12.1) (0.30)
Percentiles 
     10
th 2,243 1.0 0.18 28,425 1.0 0.11 110,250 2.0 0.07
     25
th 5,750 1.0 0.33 35,018 3.0 0.18 130,538 4.0 0.11
     50
th 13,865 2.0 0.56 53,492 5.0 0.32 184,000 9.0 0.21
     75
th 34,700 5.0 1.00 103,441 9.0 0.61 313,677 16.0 0.46
     90
th 86,625 8.0 1.00 228,187 14.0 1.00 588,900 24.0 0.93
% of HHs holding 
    one stock  33.1  13.0   7.5
% of holdings in  
    S&P 500 stocks  53.2  56.7   59.3
% of holdings in  
    local stocks  14.7  13.1   11.1
% of holdings in 
    non-S&P 500, 
    local stocks 
7.6  6.3   5.1
# HH-year obs.  268,734 88,836 23,073
# HH-stock-year obs.   1,046,282 618,756 269,298  38
Table II:  Comparison of Stock Portfolio Size and Concentration in Sample with Survey of 
Consumer Finances 
The table presents a comparison between stock portfolio values and the number of stock holdings 
in the discount brokerage sample and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for households 
with various initial portfolio levels. The two reported comparisons are between the December 
1992 sample and the 1992 SCF and between the November 1996 sample and the 1998 SCF. For 
direct comparison with the SCF, the table reports stock holdings only in taxable accounts for the 
brokerage house sample. 
Panel A:  Comparison of 12/1992 Sample with 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances 
  All Households    Portfolio at least 
$25,000    Portfolio at least 
$100,000 
  Sample SCF   Sample SCF   Sample  SCF 
Portfolio Value ($)               
     Mean  44,707 66,810 116,503 213,145 304,076 465,515
          25
th percentile  5,401 2,000 35,728 35,000 129,833  120,000
          50
th percentile  13,869 8,000 54,475 70,000 181,355  181,000
          75
th percentile  35,604 30,000 105,273 150,000 306,182 400,000
Number of Stocks               
     Mean  4.3 4.0  7.7  8.6    12.8 12.4 
          25
th percentile  1.0 1.0  3.0  3.0    5.0  4.0 
          50
th percentile  3.0 2.0  5.0  6.0    9.0 10.0 
          75
th percentile  5.0 4.0  10.0 10.0    17.0 15.0 
  Percent hold one stock  30.1 45.1  11.8  11.4   6.3  7.8 
Panel B:  Comparison of 11/1996 Sample with 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances 
  All Households    Portfolio at least 
$25,000    Portfolio at least 
$100,000 
  Sample SCF   Sample SCF   Sample  SCF 
Portfolio Value ($)               
     Mean  87,509 160,697 181,881 351,327 426,820  783,228
          25
th percentile  6,344 4,000 39,295 45,000 141,037  150,000
          50
th percentile  20,664 18,000 66,625 70,000 213,811 251,000
          75
th percentile  59,613 63,000 147,406 175,000 399,576 600,000
Number of Stocks               
     Mean  5.1 5.7    8.3 9.8    13.3 15.6 
          25
th percentile  1.0 1.0    3.0 3.0    5.0  4.0 
          50
th percentile  3.0 2.0    6.0 6.0    10.0 10.0 
          75
th percentile  6.0 6.0    10.0  11.0    17.0 20.0 
  Percent hold one stock  28.6 33.8    10.1 13.3    5.1  7.5   39
Table III:  Summary Statistics for Trades 
The table summarizes the characteristics of trades for households with various portfolio values at the end of the year preceding the 
transaction. The table reports the distribution of transaction sizes, the proportion of transactions of stocks belonging to the S&P 500 
Index, the proportion of trades in local stocks (i.e., stocks of corporations headquartered within a 50 miles radius from the location of 
the household), and the proportion of transactions of at least $10,000. The last two rows report the performance of stocks following a 
transaction. Excess returns are computed by subtracting the appropriate Fama and French (1992) benchmark portfolios formed 
according to size deciles and book-to-market deciles from raw stock returns. 
  All Households    Portfolio Less than 
$25,000    Portfolio at Least 
$25,000    Portfolio at Least 
$100,000 
 Buys  Sales    Buys  Sales    Buys  Sales    Buys  Sales 
Number of transactions  640,070 552,832   248,067 207,436   392,003 345,396  180,304 155,375 
Distribution of transactions 
   Mean ($)  10,640  12,874    5,665  6,463    13,788  16,723    19,453  24,091 
       25
th percentile ($)  2,550  2,713    1,825  1,850    3,400  3,650    4,600  5,073 
       50
th percentile ($)  4,988  5,650    3,350  3,675    6,513  7,625    9,350  11,250 
       75
th percentile ($)  10,375  12,600    6,100  7,000    14,025  17,375    20,600  25,875 
Composition of transactions                   
   Percent S&P 500  39.8  42.4    38.3  40.9    40.7  43.3    40.9  43.0 
   Percent local  14.5  15.2    15.9  17.0    13.6  14.0    12.5  12.9 
   Percent at least $10,000  26.2  31.5    12.2  15.6    35.0  41.1    47.4  54.0 
Performance after transaction                   
   Excess return following year  
         (mean, in percent) 
–1.6 0.2    –2.1 0.4    –1.4 0.1    –0.9  –0.0 
   Excess return following year  
         (median, in percent) 
–7.1  –5.3   –7.9  –5.4   –6.7  –5.3   –6.2  –5.2   40
Table IV:  Characteristics of Household Portfolios and Yearly Stock Purchases by Portfolio Concentration, 
Estimated Differences Between Portfolios with Multiple Stocks and Portfolios with One Stock  
The table summarizes the characteristics of the portfolio and the trades for households with various portfolio values at the end of the year 
preceding the transaction. For each subsample, the first column summarizes the average characteristics for households that initially hold more 
than one stock (i.e., the “Baseline”) and the second column summarizes the differences between the average characteristics of concentrated 
and diversified households.  
  All Households  Portfolio < $25,000 Portfolio ≥ $25,000 Portfolio ≥ $100,000
 
Baseline























Panel A: Total Portfolio
 
% of HHs holding assets other than common stocks  53.3 –19.8
***   48.7 –13.3
***  59.8 –38.9
***   70.8 –49.0
***
% of total assets not in common stocks  18.3 2.1
***   20..1 2.3
***  15.9 –8.7
***   15.6 –10.7
***
Panel B: Total Household-Level Stock Transactions During a Given Calendar Year
 
% of HHs with at least one stock purchase during year  55.6 –23.1
***   48.4 –16.1
***  65.7 –31.5
***   74.4 –35.4
***
# of buys per HH (mean)  3.4 –2.3
***   1.8 –0.8
***  5.5 –3.7
***   9.7 –6.5
***
# of buys conditional on at least one purchase (mean)   6.1 –2.6
***   3.8 –0.6
***  8.4 –3.2
***   13.0 –4.8
***
Total buys conditional on purchase (median, $)  13,375 –3,575
***   7,600 944
***  27,509 8,191
***   68,775 35,350
***
Total buys – total sales given purchase (median, $)  2,080 933
***   2,025 1,056
   2,250 –338
   3,496 –4,246
***
Panel C: Individual Stock Purchases
 
Amount per purchase (median, $)  4,937 373
   3,000 1,525
***  6,325 8,869
***   9,128 18,622
***
% S&P 500  39.8 0.0
   37.9 1.4
***  40.7 1.2
   40.8 3.0
 
% Local  13.7 5.1
***   14.9 3.5
***  13.1 7.6
***   12.0 12.5
***
% Non-S&P 500, Local  9.1 3.4
***   10.1 2.2
***  8.6 4.8




* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   41
Table V: Relating One-Year Stock Returns Following Purchase or Sale to Household Portfolio Concentration at Prior-Year End 
The table reports the estimates of regression specifications relating returns and concentration levels. Panels A and B report results based on 
specifications from Equations 2 and 3, estimated separately for purchases and sales. Panel C reports estimates based on all trades:         
Ri,h,t+1  to t+12 = α  + β0 BUYi,h,t + β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,y-1 + εi,h, t+1  to t+12 (Equation 4) and Xi,h,t+1 to t+12 = β0 BUYi,h,t + β1 HIh,y-1 +               
β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,y-1 + γ ΙIi,t + δ It Ri,h,t-12 to t  + εi,h, t+1  to t+12 (Equation 5).  The dependent variable is either the raw or the excess return of stock i 
purchased or sold by household h at time t during the subsequent year (Ri,h,t +1 to t+12 and Xi,h,t +1 to t+12, respectively). The excess returns are 
computed by subtracting the appropriate Fama and French (1992) benchmark portfolios formed according to size deciles and book-to-
market deciles from the raw stock returns. Specifications from Equations 3 and 5 include IIi,t, the interaction terms between the two-digit 
SIC codes and indicator variables for the 71 months during which a transaction could occur, and momentum effects, measured by the return 
of the stock during the previous 12 months, Ri,h,t-12 to t, again interacted with indicator variables for the 71 months. The Herfindahl Index is 
defined as HIh,y-1 = ∑(wh,i,y-1)
2 (wh,i,y-1 is the weight of stock i held by household h at the end of the year preceding the year in which the 
transaction took place). The indicator variable BUYi,h,t captures whether a transaction was a buy transaction. The standard errors, given in 
parentheses, take into account heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. All the returns are expressed in percentage points.   42
Table V: Continued 
 
Variable All  Households  Portfolio Less than 
$25,000 
Portfolio at Least 
$25,000 
Portfolio at Least 
$100,000 
  Panel A: Purchases Only

















Excess returns with industry-month 
and momentum controls?  No Yes No Yes No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  622,960  581,516  240,913  222,569  382,047  358,947 175,714  165,761
  Panel B: Sales Only

















Excess returns with industry-month 
and momentum controls?  No Yes No Yes No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  533,061  509,869  199,429  189,957  333,632  319,912 149,956  143,910
  Panel C: Purchases and Sales























































     Herfindahl + Buy indicator * Herfindahl 
    (i.e., buy of concentrated investor  


















Excess returns with industry-month 
and momentum controls?  No Yes No Yes No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  1,156,021 1,091,385 440,342  412,526  715,679  678,859 325,670  309,671
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   43
Table VI: Relating One-Year Stock Returns Following Purchase or Sale to Household Portfolio 
Concentration at Prior-Year End, Inclusion of Household Fixed Effects 
The table reports the estimates of the fixed-effects regression specification based on Equations 2 
through 5. The variables and the underlying specifications are the same as in Table V. The only 
difference is the inclusion of fixed effects. For example, fixed effects are incorporated into Equations 4 
and 5 to produce Equations 6 and 7, respectively: 
Ri,h,t+1  to t+12 = β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,y-1 + µ Ih BUYh +  η Ih SELLh + εi,h, t+1  to t+12                        (6) 
Xi,h,t+1  to t+12 = β1HIh,y-1 + β2BUYi,h,tHIh,y-1 + γΙIi,t + δItRi,h,t-12 to t +µIhBUYh + ηIhSELLh +εi,h, t+1 to t+12   (7). 
The dependent variables are the raw return and the excess return of stock i purchased or sold by 
household h at time t during the subsequent year (Ri,h,t +1 to t+12 and Xi,h,t +1 to t+12, respectively). Ih BUYh 
and  Ih SELLh denote that separate household fixed effects are included for buys and sales, thus 
controlling for the average stock-picking ability (both for purchases and sales) of the household. The 
indicator variable BUYi,h,t captures whether a transaction was a buy transaction. The buy indicator 
variable is not included in the regression by itself, as it is absorbed in the household fixed effects. The 
standard errors are given in parentheses and take into account heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation. The full sample consists of 52,661 households. All the returns are expressed in percentage 
points. 
Variable  Without Fixed Effects  With Fixed Effects for 
Purchases & sales 
  Panel A: Purchases Only 









Excess returns with industry-month 
and momentum controls?        No      Yes        No      Yes 
Number of observations       622,960   581,516       622,960   581,516 
  Panel B: Sales Only 









Excess returns with industry-month 
and momentum controls?        No      Yes        No      Yes 
Number of observations        533,061   509,869       533,061   509,869 
  Panel C: Purchases and Sales





     absorbed
  absorbed


















   Herfindahl+Buy indicator*Herfindahl 
    (i.e., buy of concentrated investor 










Excess returns with industry-month 
and momentum controls?          No      Yes         No      Yes 
Number of observations        1,156,021 1,091,385     1,156,021 1,091,385
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   44
Table VII:  One-Year Excess Returns Following Transactions, Differential Between Purchases and Sales,  
Interaction with S&P 500 Status and Locality of Stock 
The table reports the estimates of the regression specification relating returns and concentration levels: Xi,h,t+1 to t+12 = β0 BUYi,h,t +      
β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,y-1 + γ ΙIi,t + δ It Ri,h,t-12 to t  + εi,h, t+1  to t+12 (Equation 5).  The dependent variable is the excess return of stock i 
purchased or sold by household h at time t during the subsequent year (Xi,h,t +1 to t+12). The excess returns are computed by subtracting 
the appropriate Fama and French (1992) benchmark portfolios formed according to size deciles and book-to-market deciles from the 
raw stock returns. The specification also includes IIi,t, the interaction terms between the two-digit SIC codes and indicator variables for 
the 71 months during which a transaction could occur, and momentum effects, measured by the return of the stock during the previous 
12 months, Ri,h,t-12 to t, again interacted with indicator variables for the 71 months. The Herfindahl Index is defined as HIh,y-1 = ∑(wh,i,y-
1)
2 (wh,i,y-1 is the weight of stock i held by household h at the end of the year preceding the year in which the transaction took place). 
The indicator variable BUYi,h,t captures whether a transaction was a buy transaction. The difference between one-year excess returns 
following purchases and excess returns following sales is (β0 + β2) for perfectly concentrated households and β0 for perfectly 
diversified households, yielding a difference in the buy/sale differential return across perfectly concentrated and diversified 
households of β2 (shown in the table). The difference in differential returns (i.e., the return to concentration) is reported for various 
samples of transactions formed on the basis of the stock’s S&P 500 status and the locality to the investor. Stocks headquartered within 
50 miles of the investor are classified as local stocks. The standard errors, given in parentheses, take into account heteroskedasticity 




(given  know 
HH Location) 
S&P 500  Non-S&P 500 Local Non-Local S&P 500,
Local


















































































































* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   45
Table VIII: Sensitivity of Return to Concentration to Specific Stocks and Non-Stock Holdings 
The table reports the estimates of the regression specification relating returns and concentration levels: 
Xi,h,t+1  to t+12 = β0 BUYi,h,t + β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,y-1 + γ ΙIi,t + δ It Ri,h,t-12 to t  + εi,h, t+1  to t+12 (Equation 
5).  The dependent variable is the excess return of stock i purchased or sold by household h at time t 
during the subsequent year (Xi,h,t+1 to t +12). The excess returns are computed by subtracting the 
appropriate Fama and French (1992) benchmark portfolios formed according to size deciles and book-
to-market deciles from the raw stock returns. The specification also includes IIi,t, the interaction terms 
between the two-digit SIC codes and indicator variables for the 71 months during which a transaction 
could occur, and momentum effects, measured by the return of the stock during the previous 12 
months, Ri,h,t-12 to t, again interacted with indicator variables for the 71 months. The Herfindahl Index is 
defined as HIh,y-1 = ∑(wh,i,y-1)
2 (wh,i,y-1 is the weight of stock i held by household h at the end of the year 
preceding the year in which the transaction took place). The indicator variable BUYi,h,t captures 
whether a transaction was a buy transaction. The difference between one-year excess returns following 
purchases and excess returns following sales is (β0 + β2) for perfectly concentrated households and 
β0 for perfectly diversified households, yielding a difference in the buy/sale differential return across 
perfectly concentrated and diversified households of β2 (i.e., the return to concentration), shown in the 
table for various subsamples. The first row displays differential returns for the full sample. The next 
three rows feature differential returns for the subsamples that exclude stocks according to three 
criteria: largest transactions, largest (smallest) subsequent returns, and largest number of transactions. 
The last two rows present differential returns for the subsamples of households that hold, or do not 
hold, assets other than common stocks. The standard errors, given in parentheses, take into account 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. All the returns are expressed in percentage points. 




























(3) Replace stock’s excess return with 










(4) Exclude stock(s) that had the largest 










(5) Exclude stock(s) that had the largest 










(6) Exclude stock(s) that had the largest 










(7) Household holds assets other than 





















* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table IX: Relating Stock Returns at Various Horizons Following Purchase or Sale to 
Household Portfolio Concentration at Prior-Year End 
The table reports the estimates of two regression specifications relating returns and concentration levels: Ri,h,t to t +∆t = α  + β0 BUYi,h,t +           
β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,y-1 + εi,h, t  to t+∆t (Equation 4) and Xi,h t to t+∆t = β0 BUYi,h,t + β1 HIh,y-1 + β2 BUYi,h,t HIh,y-1 + γ ΙIi,t + δ It Ri,h,t-12 to t  + εi,h, t  
to t+∆t (Equation 5).  The dependent variable is either the raw return of stock i purchased or sold by household h at time t during the subsequent 
time interval ∆t (Ri,h,t  to t+∆t), or the excess return of stock i purchased or sold by household h at time t during the subsequent time interval ∆t 
(Xi,h,t  to t+∆t). The time intervals we consider are one week, one month, three months, six months, and one year since purchase. The excess 
returns are computed by subtracting the appropriate Fama and French (1992) benchmark portfolios formed according to two size and three 
book-to-market groupings from the raw stock returns. The second specification includes IIi,t, the interaction terms between the two-digit SIC 
codes and indicator variables for the individual trading days during which a transaction could occur, and momentum effects, measured by the 
return of the stock during the previous 12 months, Ri,h,t-12 to t, interacted with indicator variables for the 71 months in the sample. The 
Herfindahl Index is defined as HIh,y-1 = ∑(wh,i,y-1)
2 (wh,i,y-1 is the weight of stock i held by household h at the end of the year preceding the year 
in which the transaction took place). The indicator variable BUYi,h,t captures whether a transaction was a buy transaction. The standard errors, 
given in parentheses, take into account heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. All the returns are expressed in percentage points.  




Portfolio at Least 
$100,000
  Panel A: One-week return 



















Herfindahl + Herfindahl*Buy indicator
(i.e., buy of concentrated investor  


















Excess Returns & Controls?  No  Yes          No  Yes          No      Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  1,192,132 1,124,343      455,113  425,790       737,019    698,553  335,507  318,764
  Panel B: One-month return 



















Herfindahl + Herfindahl*Buy indicator
(i.e., buy of concentrated investor  


















Excess Returns & Controls?  No  Yes          No  Yes          No      Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  1,190,993 1,123,629      454,552  425,455       736,441    698,174  335,267  318,617
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   47
Table IX: Continued 




Portfolio at Least 
$100,000
  Panel C: Three-month return 



















Herfindahl + Herfindahl*Buy indicator
(i.e., buy of concentrated investor  


















Excess Returns & Controls?  No  Yes          No  Yes          No      Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  1,186,448 1,119,326      452,553  423,599       733,895    695,727  334,149  317,528
  Panel D: Six-month return 



















Herfindahl + Herfindahl*Buy indicator
(i.e., buy of concentrated investor  


















Excess Returns & Controls?  No  Yes          No  Yes          No      Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  1,177,380 1,110,785      448,834  420,153       728,546    690,632  331,702  315,209
  Panel E: One-year return 



















Herfindahl + Herfindahl*Buy indicator
(i.e., buy of concentrated investor  


















Excess Returns & Controls?  No  Yes          No  Yes          No      Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations  1,155,970 1,090,941      440,619  412,569       715,351    678,372  325,418  309,381
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table X: Monthly Portfolio Returns Measuring the Differential in 
Performance of Trades between Concentrated and Diversified Households 
The average raw return per month and the abnormal return per month (Alpha) from various portfolios over the period from February 1991 
to November 1997 are expressed in percentage points. Abnormal monthly returns are calculated from a four-factor model, which accounts 
for the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum effects (Carhart (1997)). The loadings on the four factors are not displayed in the 
table. We aggregate the trades made by concentrated and diversified investors into portfolios to test whether the trades (return following 
purchases minus return following sales) made by concentrated households outperform those placed by diversified households. For various 
subsamples—trades in all stocks, trades in stocks classified according to their S&P 500 Index membership status, trades in stocks 
characterized by the distance between the household and the corporate headquarters, as well as the interactions of the latter two criteria—
we form zero-cost portfolios and evaluate their performance. A stock is defined to be local to the household if the firm is headquartered 
within 50 miles of the household. The long side of each zero-cost portfolio is itself a zero-cost portfolio wherein all the stock purchases 
(sales) made by concentrated households are on its long (short) side. The short side, quite analogously, again is itself a zero-cost portfolio 
wherein all the stock purchases (sales) made by diversified households are on its long (short) side. We define a concentrated investor as 
one with a portfolio Herfindahl Index of at least 0.5 at the prior year-end. A stock transaction is kept in the appropriate portfolio (buy/sale, 
concentrated/diversified) for 12 months, starting with the first full calendar month after the transaction, with the aggregated transactions 
weighted by the amount of the transaction. The top panel focuses on portfolios formed with stock trades made by all households. The 
bottom panel focuses on portfolios formed with stock trades made by households with stock portfolios of at least $100,000 at the prior 
year-end. Standard errors incorporate the Newey-West correction with autocorrelation up to three lags. 
 
All Stocks  S&P 500  Non-S&P 500 Local Non-Local S&P 500,
Local







Panel A: All Households 





























































Panel B: Household Portfolio $100,000+ 






































































* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   49
Table XI: Excess Monthly Portfolio Returns, Concentrated vs. Not Concentrated Holdings,  
by Investment Type (S&P 500 status interacted with locality) 
The average abnormal return per month (Alpha) from various portfolios over the period from February 1991 to December 1996 is expressed in 
percentage points. Abnormal monthly returns are calculated from a four-factor model, which accounts for the market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects (Carhart (1997)). The loadings on the four factors are not displayed in the table. Concentrated investments are the stocks held by 
households that hold only two or fewer stocks (two stocks is the median sample ownership across all households). The alpha for concentrated 
investments in the universe of all stocks is the excess return on investments held by households that hold only one or two stocks weighted across all such 
household portfolios, while the alpha for not-concentrated investments in the universe of all stocks is the excess return on investments held by 
households that hold more than two stocks, weighted across all such household portfolios. The alpha for concentrated investments in S&P 500 stocks is 
the abnormal return on S&P 500 stocks held by concentrated investors, weighted across all such households, while the alpha for not-concentrated 
investments in all S&P 500 stocks is the abnormal return on S&P 500 investments held by households that hold more than two stocks, weighted across 
all such stock positions. The alphas for concentrated and not concentrated investments are defined analogously for the other categories of stocks (e.g., 
local, non-S&P 500 and local, etc.).  A stock is defined to be local to the household if the firm is headquartered within 50 miles of the household. The 
holdings are kept in the portfolio for one month, after which time the portfolio is updated with the households’ stock holdings at the end of the next 
month. The top panel focuses on portfolios formed with stocks held by all households. The bottom panel focuses on portfolios formed with stocks held 
by households with stock portfolios of at least $100,000. Standard errors incorporate the Newey-West correction with autocorrelation up to three lags. 
 
All Stocks  S&P 500  Non-S&P 500 Local Non-Local S&P 500,
Local

































































































































































































* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   50
Table XII: Monthly Sharpe Ratios of Households by Average Portfolio Concentration 
The average monthly household portfolio excess return (raw return minus the Treasury bill rate), monthly standard 
deviation of excess returns, and the resulting Sharpe ratio is calculated for each of the 14,702 household that have at 
least 60 months of household portfolio returns over the period from February 1991 to December 1996. Concentrated 
households are those whose beginning of year portfolio concentration averages 0.5 or more over the sample period 
(where the portfolio concentration measure is the inverse of the number of stocks in the portfolio). All the returns 
and standard deviations are expressed in percentage points. 
  Concentrated Households  Diversified Households  Difference 
  Panel A: Average Monthly Household Excess Returns
 
Mean 1.1    1.0   0.1
*** 
       99
th %  4.8    3.4   1.4
*** 
       95
th %  3.2    2.4   0.8
*** 
       90
th %  2.6    1.9   0.6
*** 
       75
th %  1.7    1.4   0.3
*** 
     Median  1.0    1.0   0.0
 
       25
th %  0.4    0.6   –0.2
*** 
       10
th %  –0.1    0.2   –0.4
*** 
       5
th %  –0.6    –0.0   –0.5
*** 
       1
st %  –1.7    –0.7   –0.9
*** 
  Panel B: Standard Deviation of Monthly Household Portfolio Returns 
Mean 9.2    6.2   3.0
*** 
       99
th %  26.7    15.7   11.0
*** 
       95
th %  18.3    11.6   6.7
*** 
       90
th %  15.3    9.8   5.4
*** 
       75
th %  11.1    7.3   3.8
*** 
     Median  7.8    5.5   2.4
*** 
       25
th %  5.8    4.2   1.6
*** 
       10
th %  4.7    3.6   1.1
*** 
       5
th %  4.2    3.3   0.9
*** 
       1
st %  3.4    2.9   0.6
*** 
  Panel C: Monthly Household Portfolio Sharpe Ratio 
Mean 0.14    0.18   –0.05
*** 
       99
th %  0.40    0.43   –0.04
*** 
       95
th %  0.34    0.36   –0.03
*** 
       90
th %  0.29    0.33   –0.04
*** 
       75
th %  0.22    0.26   –0.04
*** 
     Median  0.14    0.19   –0.05
*** 
       25
th %  0.05    0.11   –0.06
*** 
       10
th %  –0.01    0.04   –0.05
*** 
       5
th %  –0.05    –0.01   –0.05
*** 
       1




* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  